Today, Doomberg returns to the show. We discuss the cascading events unfolding in the Middle East and Ukraine, and how the global hydrocarbon shortage has shifted from crude oil to refined products. As US lawmakers consider a diesel export ban, how severe could the situation become? Further, what does the crisis mean for the midterms, and is the AI power boom sustainable?
Doomberg is an independent, reader-supported publication, primarily hosted on Substack, covering energy, finance, and geopolitics. It is one of the most widely read finance and energy newsletters on the platform, with analysis sitting at the intersection of energy, finance, commodities, and politics. For anonymity, Doomberg modulates his voice during appearances.
Read Doomberg's Escalation Clauses for free here.
Podcast Briefing: an Edited Q&A
The following Q&A has been adapted from the HC Commodities Podcast and edited for clarity and length.
AI's Real Bottleneck
Paul Chapman: Data centres are expanding rapidly to support AI, but power supply increasingly appears to be the real constraint. How do you view the relationship between AI demand and the energy sector?
Hill Vaden: Much of the public discussion around AI focuses on models, software and productivity gains. The physical reality is that AI ultimately depends on infrastructure. Data centres are becoming the critical bottleneck to hyperscaler growth, and power supply has become the critical bottleneck to data centre development.
What we are seeing is an unprecedented demand pull from hyperscalers. Their appetite for compute is creating an equally large appetite for power. That demand is now shaping investment decisions throughout the energy sector and creating opportunities for entirely new generation projects to be financed and built.
The Financial Engine Behind the AI Buildout
Paul Chapman: How does the financing process work when a hyperscaler decides it needs another major data centre?
Hill Vaden: It starts with a long-term contract. A hyperscaler agrees to purchase power over an extended period, giving developers confidence that there will be a reliable source of revenue behind a new project.
That contract then becomes the foundation upon which financing is raised. Lenders and investors are far more willing to support a project if the offtaker is a highly creditworthy company with a long-term need for electricity.
At the same time, enormous amounts of infrastructure capital have been raised globally. Investors are searching for long-duration assets that can generate predictable returns, and power infrastructure increasingly fits that requirement. The intersection between AI growth and energy demand has therefore become one of the most attractive themes in infrastructure investing today.
The Race for Speed to Power
Paul Chapman: We keep hearing the term "speed to power". Why has it become so important?
Hill Vaden: Data centre developers want capacity online quickly, but grid connections often take years. That gap has encouraged increasingly creative solutions, including behind-the-meter generation using gas engines and fuel cells. In many cases, the ability to secure power quickly has become one of the most important competitive advantages in the entire AI infrastructure buildout.
Why Natural Gas Sits at the Centre of the Story
Paul Chapman: What role does natural gas ultimately play in enabling AI-driven growth?
Hill Vaden: The issue is less about AI itself and more about reliability. Data centres require power around the clock, often with extremely demanding uptime requirements. While renewable generation continues to grow, hyperscalers still need access to dispatchable power that is available whenever it is required.
That reality has placed natural gas in a particularly strong position. It remains one of the most practical ways to provide large amounts of reliable power at scale, which is one reason why regions such as Texas continue to attract investment.
Interestingly, the hyperscalers do not generally want to become energy companies themselves. Their preference is to secure long-term power through contracts while leaving generation and operational risk to utilities and developers.
Why This Looks More Like Shale Than Dot-Com
Paul Chapman: Many people compare AI to the dot-com boom. Why do you think shale is the more useful analogy?
Hill Vaden: Shale was the last energy investment boom that combined technological innovation, abundant capital and intense competition. It was location-specific, infrastructure-intensive and characterised by a race to secure strategic positions before the opportunity became fully understood.
You can see similar dynamics emerging today. Developers are competing for land, power access and customers in much the same way that shale operators once competed for acreage. There is a clear winner-takes-most mentality in parts of the market.
The other similarity is the importance of demand pull. Hill points to George Mitchell's early pipeline commitments as an example of how guaranteed demand helped unlock investment and innovation in shale. In today's market, hyperscaler demand is playing a similar role by providing the commercial rationale for new power projects.
The details may be different, but the combination of capital, infrastructure development, innovation and competitive urgency gives this cycle a distinctly shale-like feel.
The global market for competitive seaborne diesel barrels is already incredibly tight, so any previously moderate disruption to those flows would be catastrophic.
The Operational Limits of Global Refineries
Paul Chapman: Can the world’s remaining refineries simply run harder to replace the lost production?
Doomberg: Refineries are complex, integrated chemical plants processing enormous quantities of highly combustible material under intense pressure and temperature. Running them continuously at 98, 99 or even more than 100 per cent of stated capacity while postponing maintenance increases the probability of operational failure.
The economics of refining add to the problem. It is frequently a poor business in which returns are difficult to earn consistently. When margins improve, operators have a strong incentive to maximise output. Yet prolonged underinvestment means facilities may be least resilient precisely when the market needs them most.
An additional outage could come from an accident, equipment failure or sabotage. Whatever the cause, the result would be the loss of more refining capacity from an already constrained system.
The Four Risks Facing Diesel Markets
Paul Chapman: What are the four developments that could turn the current diesel shortage into a more severe crisis?
Doomberg: The first is a US restriction on diesel exports. The second is India withdrawing supply from the international market. The third is an outage among refineries already operating at exceptionally high utilisation. The fourth is further escalation in the Middle East. The risks are also synergistic. The development of one increases the probability or severity of the others.
Shipping Routes as a Commodity Risk
Paul Chapman: How important have shipping constraints become to the wider energy crisis?
Doomberg: Increasingly important. Further escalation could threaten Middle Eastern gas assets, the Red Sea or the Suez Canal. A large vessel disabled in a narrow waterway would materially disrupt global trade.
Ships that cannot use their normal route must travel substantially farther, pushing utilisation and freight rates higher. Shipping costs are consequently becoming almost as important as the underlying oil price in determining the delivered cost of a cargo.
Commodity Fragmentation and Europe’s Vulnerability
Paul Chapman: Could government intervention and the fragmentation of commodity markets begin to undermine the global trading system itself?
Doomberg: The natural response to deglobalisation is for each country to secure its own supply when scarcity intensifies. Export bans and other interventions may protect domestic consumers, but they also weaken the international flows that have allowed the global economy to absorb shortages without more severe consequences.
The vulnerable parties are those without control over their own resources. Europe does not produce enough crude oil or refined product to meet its needs. If globalisation brought both benefits and costs, reversing it means surrendering the benefits as well. For commodity-importing economies, that process is likely to be particularly painful.
Natural Gas, Weather and Europe’s Winter Risk
Paul Chapman: Where does El Niño sit within the wider European energy outlook? Is it another factor through which the market should view the current crisis?
Doomberg: Europe faces a second potential energy crisis through natural gas. It moved away from long-term, fixed pipeline contracts towards greater dependence on spot LNG imports, predominantly from the US and Qatar. The war in Ukraine exposed the risks associated with that decision.
During the previous crisis, Europe benefited from an extraordinarily mild winter. Without it, the outcome could have been very different. Europe now approaches another winter with, in several respects, a worse starting position.
We are cautious about making catastrophic weather predictions. Weather is a nonlinear system and is extremely difficult to forecast. However, disrupted weather patterns create the possibility that Europe receives a harsh winter rather than another mild one. If that coincided with acute pressure in diesel markets, it would place additional strain on the continent’s energy system.
Political Cycles and Energy Investment
Paul Chapman: What could the US midterm elections mean for energy policy and commodity investment?
Doomberg: We would expect at least one chamber of Congress to move to the Democrats, and possibly both. From an energy perspective, that would stall the momentum of the administration’s early policies.
The deeper problem is that the capital cycle in heavy industry is already longer than the American political cycle. Policy can swing from an administration supporting 30GW of offshore wind to its successor making such development extremely difficult. That whiplash destroys capital and discourages future investment.
Even without a complete reversal of existing policy, the prospect of another change in 2028 can be enough to delay investment in the midstream assets required to make the energy system function.
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